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“(…) civilization is, in its earliest 
phases, played. It does not come from 
play like a baby detaching itself from 
the womb: it arises in and as play, and 
never leaves it. (Huizinga 1955 : 173) 
 
It appears as though at the margins of the above quotation from Huizinga’s Homo 
Ludens: A Study of Play-Element in Culture Samuel Beckett wants to add a mocking 
commentary “Old endgame lost of old, play and lose and have done with losing.” (Beckett 
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2009 : 9) However, I believe that by addressing this very primal idea of culture, the author of 
Endgame does not mean negate but  challenge. Therefore the aim of my paper is to add a new 
point to the general debate on the negative features of Beckett’s plays, specifically Endgame, 
and determine whether the Irish playwright actually succeeds in escaping tradition in his  
revolutionary project. Although the matter appears to have been thoroughly discussed already, 
by Pascal Casanova and Erik Tonning for instance, I would like to present the problem from a 
different perspective, that is, by applying Gadamer’s notion of play1 as an ontological concept 
of the artwork to Endgame in particular, and then explore the resulting interaction. My 
intention is to determine not only how but whether attaining abstraction in the work of art such 
as Endgame is at all possible and whether it is indeed what Beckett sets out to accomplish. 
What will emerge following this approach is that in order to comprehend Beckett via his own 
negative method involves a new perspective on the nature of the supposed nihilism attributed 
to his works. It is not my purpose to discuss Beckett’s ‘nihilism’ in this article since this topic 
has already been commented on by many scholars – Shane Weller for instance2; rather, I would 
like to introduce a new method with which to comprehend and conceptualize said nihilism and 
then apply the method to his work.   
 
A possible reference 
 
Would it be both possible and legitimate to imply a link between absurdist drama and 
the tradition of the absurd in face of the inherent motif of negation as stated in the Theatre of 
the Absurd’s manifesto? I believe this link is not so obviously present or self-evident; it is 
essential to investigate the reflection of and on the past intrinsic to this kind of artistic 
movement: the movement by means of negation, which only gives the reflection of the past a 
deliberately antithetical, twisted appearance. Beckett wrote two plays that, according to Erik 
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Tonning in Samuel Beckett’s Abstract Drama are related  to the tradition of the absurd 
precisely through contradicting its concepts. These plays are Waiting for Godot and Endgame. 
Examining them makes it possible to shed light on the multidimensional understanding of 
Beckett’s plays.    
Although it may appear paradoxical,  such a hypothesis was established before Beckett 
by the Polish playwright, artist and philosopher Stanisław Ingnacy Witkiewicz, also known 
under his artistic pseudonym – Witkacy – mainly acknowledged for his paintings that belong to 
the Polish avant-garde in the interwar period3. Not only had he written dramas that show a 
great resemblance to the theatre of the absurd and that appear as antecedents of Beckett and 
Ionesco, for instance; the author of New Forms in Painting also produced many philosophical 
essays about what he called “the new theatre” or “new forms in the theatre”.    
When introducing his new form of the theatre Witkacy emphasizes the fact that in spite 
of its  apparently revolutionary course it should carefully avoid the lure of attempting to 
become something utterly new, that is, negating old tendencies totally. On the contrary, it 
should originate directly in the past but oppose itself to the psychological, realistic drama that 
was most popular at the time.  
 
One cannot deny an absolute affinity with life even though one does not consider a play 
from life’s perspective only4. (Witkiewicz 1974 : 283) 
 
Witkacy observes an essential familiarity and shared quality of the old theatrical form 
and his pure form. He continues that the theatre should purposely “plunge the viewer into this 
new dimension of experience, which was attainable in connection with the myths of the past”5 
(285). In other words, the theatre should make possible what he calls a metaphysical 
experience – a feeling of anxiety that detaches the viewer from his or hers everyday life in 
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order to face the mystery of existence. In his Poetics Aristotle points to catharsis as the essence 
of tragedy6. I believe that the metaphysical experience related to the idea of pure form, and 
thereby to the experience of the theatre of the absurd, can be considered in analogy with  
catharsis – the purification experienced in ancient tragedy.7  
What emerges as the common aspect of myths and tragedy is the influence they have on 
the viewer, which according to Aristotle is the vital foundation of tragedy as such. It arises 
from certain parallels between myth and theatre inherent in the form rather than the content of 
the artwork;  Witkacy associates the essence of classical tragedy precisely with its formal unity 
(249).   
Furthermore, Witkacy specifically indicates catharsis as the link between classical form 
and his own pure form explaining in what follows the priority of the formal feature of the work 
of art, upon which the metaphysical element is founded. What is more, the author of The New 
Forms in Painting observes the evanescence of metaphysical experiences beginning with the 
ancient world, with the exception of fleeting moments of ecstasy. Gadamer defines ekstasis as 
a modus of being outside of the self, figures of which are the constitutive elements of catharsis,  
misery and horror. The ecstatic nature of these feelings consists in: 
 
(…) being overcome by misery and horror involves a painful division. There is a 
disjunction from what is happening, a refusal to accept that rebels against the agonizing 
events. (Gadamer 2004 : 127) 
 
This painful division appears to apply only to the spectator who faces a conflict as he 
disagrees with (ergo does not understand) what is happening on stage. Here lies the essence of 
catharsis, provided of course that - in accordance with Aristotle’s definition - we presuppose 
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that the basic experience of catharsis is purification - by releasing oneself from  horror and 
misery. The author of Truth and Method  defines purification as:  
 
precisely to dissolve this disjunction from what is. It effects the total liberation of the 
constrained heart. We are freed not only from the spell in which the misery and horror 
of the tragic fate had bound us, but at the same time we are free from everything that 
divides us from what is. (127) 
 
It may be asserted that tragic reflection – ‘pensiveness’ - appears in spite of the 
characteristically disproportionate resolution of guilt and fate, as the essence of tragic 
reflection is more profound: 
 
(…) what does the spectator affirm here? (…) Tragic pensiveness does not affirm the 
tragic course of events as such, or the justice of the fate that overtakes the hero but 
rather a metaphysical order of being that is true for all. To see that "this is how it is" is a 
kind of self-knowledge for the spectator, who emerges with new insight from the 
illusions in which he, like everyone else, lives. The tragic affirmation is an insight that 
the spectator has by virtue of the continuity of meaning in which he places himself.  
(128) 
. 
Firstly, Gadamer implies that in regard to the artwork the simple idea of subjectively 
conceived meaning should be abandoned; otherwise the artwork would fail to be an “an 
ontological concept from which (…) the structure of artistic truth” (Zuidervaart 2004 : 57) 
might be derived. What is more though, he seems to add an important dimension to it – the 
mirror that shows the very avant-garde’s backward moving revolution in the subject-object 
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relation implied in art. By leaving the circle of the subjective abyss the viewer retreats back to 
himself and gains a specific kind of self-knowledge. The concept of fate in tragedy reflects the  
“metaphysical order of being that is true for all”, or rather a continuance of meaning in the 
light of which the viewer recognizes himself, as „this is how it is” occurs momentarily as 
something strange and divergent. This very situation seems to be displayed in Endgame by 
regularly recurring pieces of dialogue: 
  
Hamm: What's happening?  
Clov: Something is taking its course. (Beckett 2009 : 20) 
 
However, at the same time Gadamer accentuates that the  
 
spectator does not hold himself aloof at the distance characteristic of an aesthetic 
consciousness enjoying the art with which something is represented, but rather 
participates in the communion of being presented (Gadamer 2004 : 128).  
 
For that reason, the quidditas of affirmation lies within the scope of tragic pensiveness, 
in which the viewer recognizes, in face of the irreducible strangeness of fate, that he does not 
stand alone but within a participating community of others. 
Since in terms of ancient tragedy we speak of the three unities, Gadamer claims that upon 
these unities the meaning of the theatrical work is based: 
 
Tragedy is the unity of a tragic course of events that is experienced as such. But what is 
experienced as a tragic course of events (…) is a closed circle of meaning that of itself 
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resists all penetration and interference. What is understood as tragic must simply be 
accepted. Hence it is, in fact, a phenomenon basic to the "aesthetic." (126) 
  
In the above passage from Truth and Method we should cautiously reflect on 
Gadamer’s last sentence where he considers tragedy to be a primal aesthetic phenomenon. 
Given that, we may arrive at the conclusion that tragedy determines the mode of being of the 
work of art as such and this mode is described by Gadamer as play: 
 
When we speak of play in reference to the experience of art, this means neither the 
orientation nor even the state of mind of the creator or of those enjoying the work of art, 
nor the freedom of a subjectivity engaged in play, but the mode of being of the work of 
art itself. (102) 
 
The key role of the ontological concept of play as conceived by Gadamer is to direct our 
attention to the fact that the work of art exists in the inter-subjective sphere; thus he 
emphasizes the autonomy of  play and playing. In accordance, it appears worth recalling here 
that Heyman makes the unmitigated autonomy of the artwork the crucial element of the anti-
theatrical manifesto of the theatre of the absurd8. Yet, Gadamer deepens his analysis of the 
mode of being of the artwork by claiming that this autonomy is only an element of the 
situation in which an aesthetic experience may occur as  play. Thus he asserts:  
 
The "subject" of the experience of art, that which remains and endures, is not 
the subjectivity of the person who experiences it but the work itself. This is the 
point at which the mode of being of play becomes significant. For play has its 
own essence, independent of the consciousness of those who play . (103)  
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Moreover, it is the nature of play to transform the players. Although the author of Truth 
and Method emphasizes that the ontological autonomy of the play forms the subject in its own 
mode of being, simultaneously he points to the subject’s relation to itself and to the play. 
While participating in the play the subject becomes transformed. However, in order to occur 
the play itself requires a participant. Therefore the moment of presentation demarcates the 
interdependence of the play and its subject. In this manner the play may occur in its pendulous 
inner movement, expressed in the very word “playing”.   
 
In each case what is intended is to-and-fro movement that is not tied to any goal 
that 
would bring it to an end. (104) 
 
According to Gadamer the mode of being of the work of art is that of play, and that 
involves self-presentation. The metaphor of play depicts as it were the occurrence of the third 
reality in the momentary encounter of two other realities: the subject and the work of art. In 
this third dimension the latter, the work of art, undergoes a substantial transformation. 
Gadamer further claims that the result of this process is a transformation into structure.  
 
But transformation means that something is suddenly and as a whole something else, 
that this other transformed thing that it has become is its true being, in comparison with 
which its earlier being is nil. When we find someone transformed we mean precisely 
this, that he has become another person, as it were. (111) 
 
The entire space where play occurs along with the subject undergoes a transformation, which 
results in revealing some kind of truth. What truth? Gadamer claims: “In being presented in 
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play, what is emerges”.(112) Is it something substantially different from what was there 
before? Here the author makes a reference to the classical idea of substance, according to 
which case transformation is only possible as an accidental occurrence at the level of 
phenomena, whereas the very subject of transformation remains unchanged. Therefore, what it 
means is that the truth is indeed uncovered, recognized. What is more, it appears that from this 
assertion we may conclude the following about reality as such: 
 
"Reality" always stands in a horizon of desired or feared or, at any rate, still undecided 
future possibilities. Hence it is always the case that mutually exclusive expectations are 
aroused, not all of which can be fulfilled. The undecidedness of the future permits such 
a superfluity of expectations that reality necessarily lags behind them. (112) 
 
The fact that we perceive reality through a future-directed perspective, which due to its 
ambiguity is a constant source of both desire and anxiety, results in its concealment in the 
multitude of expectations. Thus we may say that a future-oriented attitude obscures the horizon 
of what is now. Is it possible to break through this concealment? In order to release oneself 
from the suggestiveness of desired goals it is necessary, according to Gadamer,  to be detached 
from what is; this would enable one to perceive wholeness as a closed sphere of meaning.     
 
Moreover, someone who can see the whole of reality as a closed circle of meaning in 
which everything is fulfilled will speak of the comedy and tragedy of life. In these cases, 
where reality is understood as a play or game, emerges the reality of play, which we call 
the play of art. The being of all play is always self-realization, sheer fulfillment, 
energeia which has its telos within itself. The world of the work of art, in which play 
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expresses itself fully in the unity of its course, is in fact a wholly transformed world. In 
and through it everyone recognizes that this is how things are. (112) 
  
This kind of detachment is indispensable if one is to speak of a comedy and tragedy of 
life, and this in turn is not attainable unless one is able to perceive the wholeness of meaning. 
Yet,  wholeness is concealed while we are immersed in the everyday world surrounding us, 
that is in our waiting attitude. Only art as understood through the metaphor of play, which 
encompasses in its energeia the contemporary significance, and through its telos the essential 
enclosure of meaning, may facilitate detachment. 
 
Playing Endgame - exhibiting abstraction 
 
How does the above thesis apply to the anti-artistic practice of the theatre of the absurd, 
specifically Beckett?  The very characteristic of our  blurred perception of the future seems to 
be exposed in a mocking way in Endgame: “Do you believe in the life to come? Mine was 
always that.”. Following the trace of mockery I believe Beckett is in fact staging the very 
situation of the play, in the form of particular elements, which normally remain concealed 
before the viewers throughout the actual performance or reading of the play and are only 
revealed after reflection upon the aesthetic phenomena in question; in Beckett’s drama these 
phenomena are exhibited  on the stage itself. As Heyman notices: 
 
 (…) Beckett was taking an important step making the play an object in its own right, 
pointing insistently and amusingly inward at the fact of its being a play. (…) The self – 
consciously literary cadences and the recurrent dissolution of character into comedian not 
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only undermine our willingness to suspend disbelief but mock us for having started out 
with it. (Heyman 1979 : 8). 
 
Beckett’s play points to itself, exhibiting its own tools. The proof of this is that in 
Endgame tragedy is mingled with comedy, although in a specific manner, as every cautious 
comic gestures of the characters are marked with failure9 and the characters turn into 
comedians. Or to be more precise: they are subjected to mockery.  
 
Clov: Why this farce, day after day?  
Hamm: Routine. One never knows. [Pause.] (…) 
Hamm: Clov!  
Clov: [impatiently] What is it?  
Hamm: We're not beginning to ... to ... mean something?  
Clov: Mean something! You and I, mean something! [Brief laugh.] Ah that's a good one!  
Hamm: I wonder. [Pause.] (Beckett 2009 : 40) 
 
Yet, this comic quality does not fail in conveying Gadamer’s claims; on the contrary, it 
seems to even more purposively imply the distance of the play towards itself.  
Let as consider the situation of the play exhibited by Beckett, beginning with the 
presented concept of time and space. Time in Beckett’s plays is not conceived in a linear mode 
but a circular one,  and this characteristic turns into a gradually more radical imperative in his 
later plays. In Waiting for Godot there are still two parts – the first part shows a single day of 
waiting, the second is the perhaps twisted but in essence identical reflection of the first; in 
Endgame this silent rule of drama is violated. Thus Beckett  brings the very inner mechanism 
of the play as an ontological idea to the surface of the drama. This mechanism Gadamer 
describes in the following: 
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Play clearly represents an order in which the to-and-fro motion of play follows of 
itself. It is part of play that the movement is not only without goal or purpose but 
also without effort. It happens, as it were, by itself. (105) 
 
Hence, as we may still determine that the three classical unities remain present in 
Endgame, we also notice that it is overemphasized. Time is deliberately locked within a circle. 
Likewise, the space presented in the drama constitutes a closed-in sphere – an orphic circle to 
which the characters are assigned as if under some kind of spell, and therefore their actions and 
acting appear to be entirely blank and unstable. The characters are  devoid of the power 
attributed to “doing and daring”10 , and they are also devoid of the magical power derived from 
knowledge. Although there is some kind of order which appears to be related  to some 
unreachable cosmic order, Hamm and Clov are denied access to it. They are infinitely 
powerless. This spell or charm reaches the spectator and the player as well, as Gadamer states: 
 
The structure of play absorbs the player into itself, and thus frees him from the burden 
of taking the initiative, which constitutes the actual strain of existence. This is also seen 
in the spontaneous tendency to repetition that emerges in the player and in the constant 
self-renewal of play, which affects its form (e.g., the refrain). (105) 
  
Another crucial point emerges from the above passage of Truth and Method :  the self – 
renewal of the play resides in its formal aspect. This phenomenon is also exhibited by Beckett 
in Waiting for Godot, where the second part is a simple repetition of the first one with a small 
disparity in content, which nevertheless fails to affect the inner sense of the drama – it does not 
break the charm of suspended waiting. For Beckett, however, the renewal of the play is only an 
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illusory progression toward the actual confinement of the dramatic space within the magic 
circle of impassivity.  
Although the enchantment that the characters of Endgame are entangled in purposely 
resembles and imitates ancient fate it explicitly fails to deliver a resolution through tragic 
tension. Instead of the expected affirmation we face an absurd outcome – the spiralling, 
ceaseless reoccurrence of the identical which grows into a pervasive abstraction, an increasing 
and all-embracing grayness attributed to the offstage area in Endgame.  
 
Hamm: And the horizon? Nothing on the horizon? 
Clov: (Lowering the telescope, turning towards Hamm, exasperated): What in God's name 
would there be on the horizon? (Pause.) 
Hamm: The waves, how are the waves? 
Clov: The waves? (He turns the telescope on the waves.) Lead. 
Hamm: And the sun? 
Clove: (Looking) Zero. 
Hamm: But it should be sinking. Look again. 
Clov: (Looking) Damn the sun. 
Hamm: Is it night already then? 
Clov: (Looking) No. 
Hamm: Then what is it? 
Clov: (Looking) Gray. (Lowering the telescope, turning towards Hamm, louder.) Gray! (Pause, 
still louder.) GRRAY! (Beckett 2009 : 39) 
 
The abstraction appears to be flooding the artwork from an underground or submerged 
level: language and narrative, although  this progression from the mimetic to the abstract is 
 14 
perhaps more evident in Beckett’s novels, as Angela Moorjani accentuates in her book 
Abysmal Games in the Novels of Samuel Beckett (Moorjani 1982 : 15). Possibly Beckett wishes 
to convey to us the fact that theatre and art need (if possible) to escape “neatness of 
identification” – the danger that appears to be represented in Clov’s attitude: “I love order. It's 
my dream. A world where all would be silent and still, and each thing in its last place, under 
the last dust.” (Beckett 2009 : 66), but I would argue otherwise. By deliberately exhibiting  the 
mechanism of play as primal, underlying even the ontological structure of language, and 
magnifying this mechanism even into an abstract, negative absurdity, Beckett appears to imply 
that one cannot simply escape the deathly “danger” implicit in “neatness of identifications” 
(Beckett 1983: 19); in spite of the emphasized self-awareness of the play, Endgame still 
remains under its own charm – the enchantment of aesthetics:  
 
in the game (…) the constitution of the function of exhibition of presentation 
(Darstellung) can be seen, a function that doubtlessly summons the linguistic medium, 
but that in principle precedes and supports it. (Ricoeur  1991 : 41)  
 
Yet, this very function of presentation adheres to the principle of dialogical 
consciousness, pulling the play out of chaos towards the audience, as Simon Levy claims in 
“Samuel Beckett. Self-referential Drama: The Sensitive Chaos”, refering to Gadamer’s concept 
of aesthetics (Levy 2002 : 9). No matter how reduced the characters of Beckett’s dramas are 
while suspended at the edge of the void of no meaning, they possess an indispensable urge to 
communicate. As it is again represented by Clov:  
 
Finished, it's finished, nearly finished, it must be nearly finished. Grain upon grain, one 
by one, and one day, suddenly, there's a heap, a little heap, the impossible heap. I can't be 
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punished any more. I'll go now to my kitchen, ten feet by ten feet by ten feet, and wait for 
him to whistle me. Nice dimensions, nice proportions, I'll lean on the table, and look at 
the wall, and wait for him to whistle me. (Beckett 2009 : 9) 
 
However, this urge to communicate is not limited to the characters only but reaches  the 
viewer as well;  it does not constitute a simple reference to the idea of dialogue as such, but 
also seems to be generated by the need to have a witness:  
 
(…) moving from “you” to “we” to “I”; then split the I so as to never leave it in solitude. 
In theatre at least a witness is a precondition. The relation (…) creates “The dialogue” as 
the dramatic answer to the question “What is there to keep me here?” (EG, 120). Without 
it no speech and no being in space on stage make any sense. (Levy 2002 : 10)  
 
The claim for making sense on stage is not a mere necessity in order to exist on the stage. 
In fact, Beckett seems dramatically close to falling into silence or absolute incomprehensibility 
as his last dramas balance at the edge of abstraction. This point is discussed by Erik Tonning in 
his Samuel Beckett’s Abstract Drama. Works for Stage and Screen 1962-1985.  Tonning draws 
a sharp distinction between these works and Waiting for Godot or Endgame, where he still 
observes a reference to tradition. Yet, although Beckett’s path may appear to be  extremely 
close to the abyss of abstraction,  I do believe it is the only possible path. As Pascal Casanova 
admits “One cannot advance the hypothesis of an absolute independence of the text with 
respect to the world, grammar and literary convention.” (Casanova 2006 : 23). I believe 
Beckett’s struggle is directed toward the reversal of the aesthetic enchantment, a reversal 
which does not signify  negation of the tradition, but signifies retracing meanings in order to 
precipitate and then aggrandize their abstract content. As this abstract content is attributed 
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firmly to the formal aspect of the drama Beckett rearranges it as if to “wear the inside out” as 
regards the ontological concept; that is the only way to make it possible for a witness to 
perceive the abstract structure he is entangled in. Thereby we are enabled to almost feel the 
touch of the veiled nihilist force standing behind the curtain and reaching for our throats. I 
believe this is Beckett’s testimony as an artist. Paradoxically, the urge to communicate that 
surfaces in Beckett’s drama wrests it from dehumanization, as Shiller claims: "Man only plays 
when in the full meaning of the word he is a man, and he is only completely a man when he 
plays." This small piece of land is left for us to inhabit in order not to speak but to 
counterpoint, to negate, to scream at the sight of language being torn apart “until that which 




                                                
1 Although standard translations use the notion of play German Spiel may also be  translated 
as game.  
2 On this subject see Shane Weller’s book A Taste for the Negative: Beckett and Nihilism. 
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3 For further information see also: Twentieth-Century Polish Avant-Garde Drama: Plays, 
Scenarios, Critical Documents. Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz ... [et al.]. Edited, translated, 
and with an introduction by Daniel Gerould, in collaboration with Eleanor Gerould. (1977); 
Witkacy: Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz As an Imaginative Writer. Daniel Gerould. (1981); 
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4 Translation made by the author of this article. For the original Polish source see Witkacy p. 
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